


NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.

OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR:  
OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FROM  
PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

by  
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College  
in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of  
Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views  
and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the  
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This paper will analyze Operation Joint Endeavor from an operational point of view, specifically focusing on the six Principles of Operations Other Than War: Objective, Unity of Effort, Legitimacy, Restraint, Perseverance, and Security.

The operational commander has a very complex, difficult mission. The Principles of Operations Other Than War provide guidance for operational planning and employment. He should also consider the Principles of War in operational planning.

The operational commander must carry out Resolution 1031 precisely and firmly reject any expansion of the mandate that will compromise his objective and security. With 14 non-NATO nations in his command, he has many command and control challenges. He must assure unity of command within IFOR and unity of effort with all non-governmental and private organizations in theater.

Bosnia-Herzegovina will remain a dangerous and volatile theater of operations for the entire operation. He must guard against complacency and continually re-evaluate the operational situation and ability to accomplish the objective.

## **PREFACE**

At the time this paper was written, Operation Joint Endeavor was in the planning stage with only the implementation force in position in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Full IFOR deployment was still months away when research was started for this subject. Operation Joint Endeavor facts and plans are taken as of early January 1996 and may or may not change after this paper is completed. The intent of this paper is to provide an analysis of the IFOR deployment and recommendations for the operational commander as it stood in January 1996. Thus, this analysis is a 'snapshot in time' of Joint Endeavor and could change dramatically as the situation develops.

Because this is a current NATO operation, much of the research sources are classified and unavailable for this writer. This material will eventually be declassified and will provide good source material for post-operation analysis and lessons learned. However, for the purposes of this paper, open-source material was sufficient for research and development of the paper.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian signatures on the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina<sup>1</sup> formally ended the Bosnian conflict and established a framework to fully implement a peaceful settlement. A robust peace operation is needed to enforce the military provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement. U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1031 authorized NATO to "take such actions as required, including use of necessary force..."<sup>2</sup> to ensure compliance with the military provisions of the Peace Agreement.

The NATO-led Bosnia Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) will deploy to the Bosnia-Herzegovina theater of operations to implement this mandate under the auspices of NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC).<sup>3</sup> This deployment, designated Operation Joint Endeavor, is the largest peace operation ever undertaken<sup>4</sup>. Additionally, this is the first peace operation under NATO operational command.

Operation Joint Endeavor is an operation other than war (OOTW) as defined in Joint Pub 3-07. This paper will analyze Operation Joint Endeavor from an operational point of view, specifically focusing on the six

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<sup>1</sup> Paris Peace Conference, *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes*. Collectively known as the Dayton Peace Agreement. Signed on 14 December 1995 in Paris by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, Security Council, *Official Records: Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1995*, Resolution 1031 (1995), S/RES/1031, (New York: 1995), I-5.

<sup>3</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Fact Sheet Background, AFSOUTHSA* (Zagreb: IFOR Coalition Press Information Center, January, 1996), 1-2. North Atlantic Council authorized deployment of IFOR enabling forces on 1 December 1995. On 5 December 1995, NATO foreign ministers approved military planning for IFOR.

<sup>4</sup> Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 102.

principles of OOTW: Objective, Unity of Effort, Legitimacy, Restraint, Perseverance, and Security.<sup>5</sup> This analysis will address the guidance the operational commander should derive from these principles and make recommendations for operational planning.

## Background

Operation Joint Endeavor is a peace operation organized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.<sup>6</sup> It is best described as a peace enforcement operation in that it most closely resembles the Joint Pub 3-07 definition: "application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions...."<sup>7</sup> IFOR provides the military force, UNSCR 1031 is the international authorization, and the Dayton Peace Agreement is the accepted resolution.

The Dayton Peace Agreement provides for sovereign equality and peaceful settlement of disputes between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.<sup>8</sup> Operation Joint Endeavor will provide the requisite combat power to enforce the military provisions of this agreement.

The NAC-approved plan called for over 60,000 personnel from some 30 countries to join the NATO-led IFOR to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement. Every NATO country has contributed military forces to IFOR; additionally, some 14 non-NATO countries are also contributing forces. IFOR's principal contingents will come from the U.S., U.K., and France. All forces will be under NATO operational control (OPCON) with the exception of

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<sup>5</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington: USGPO, 1995), V1-V4.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1031, 1.

<sup>7</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington: USGPO, 16 June 1995), III-13.

<sup>8</sup> Peace Conference, *Agreement for Peace in Bosnia*, *passim*.

the Russian contingent which will be OPCON direct to General Joulwan and under tactical control (TACON) of the U.S. 1st Armored Division Commander.<sup>9</sup>

There is a modicum of experience in the operational art of U.N. peace enforcement operations. Indeed, only four other conflicts involved U.N. sponsored peace enforcement actions: U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC)<sup>10</sup>, United Task Force (UNITAF), U.N. Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II)<sup>11</sup>, and U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR).<sup>12</sup> These operations were considerably smaller than IFOR and had disparate objectives; however, there are operational lessons learned which apply to the impending IFOR deployment. For the purposes of this paper, the Korean and Gulf conflicts are considered war due to their large scale, sustained combat operations.

Although IFOR is on a peace enforcement mission, combat operations are clearly possible in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnians and Serbs are unlikely to renew fighting with IFOR present; however, they are imminently capable of large-scale, sustained combat operations. The operational commander should prepare for and anticipate Bosnian and Serb capability not intent. Thus he should consider and plan for the likelihood of IFOR becoming involved in sustained combat.

The major military factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina have substantial offensive capabilities that make this operation fundamentally different from U.N. operations in Somalia and the Congo where belligerent forces were incapable of sustained, large-scale combat operations. The forces of the former Yugoslavia also have a long history of insurgent warfare against overwhelming odds.<sup>13</sup> The operational commander must consider both of these

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<sup>9</sup> NATO Sheet Background, 1-2; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Basic Factsheet Nr. 11 NATO's Role in the Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement* (Brussels: NATO Economic Directorate, 1996), 2.

<sup>10</sup> Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967 Documents and Commentary III Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 69-70, 81-83.

<sup>11</sup> Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1995), 28-31.

<sup>12</sup> A.B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1994), 79-84.

<sup>13</sup> Daniel P. Bolger, *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990's* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 356.

possible scenarios--renewal of large-scale, sustained combat resumes and armed insurgent warfare. IFOR has inherent self-defense capabilities but is not prepared for war or an insurgency.

On 20 December 1995, just four days after NAC approval of Operation Joint Endeavor, the Commander of IFOR (COMIFOR) assumed military authority from the Commander of UNPROFOR.<sup>14</sup> Following is a discussion of the principles of OOTW and recommendations for the operational commander.

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<sup>14</sup> NATO, *NATO's Role in Bosnia*, 2.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **THE PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

#### **Objective**

*Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective*  
Joint Pub 3-07

The objective is the essence of operational planning and historically, for peace operations, one of the most elusive. Operation Joint Endeavor's objective is clear, attainable and most importantly--terminable. The danger for this operation, like so many in the past, is expansion of mandate requirements subsequent to mission planning and deployment. This is euphemistically called 'mission creep'.

The Operation Joint Endeavor objective is to "create a stable environment for the civil aspects (of the Peace Agreement) to proceed." The primary military tasks to accomplish the objective are:

- enforce the cessation of hostilities along the established cease-fire line
- establish a four kilometer "zone of separation" between Bosnian government and Serb forces
- monitor withdrawal of heavy weapons to cantonments
- maintain governing command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> NATO, NATO's Role in Bosnia, 1; Paris Peace Conference, *Agreement for Peace in Bosnia*, Annex 1-A; Barbara Starr, "Facing the Challenge of Peace in Bosnia," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 3 January 1996, 20-22.

The United States has made a clear commitment to withdraw IFOR after the completion of about one year.<sup>16</sup> The IFOR objective is thus reduced to simply keeping the Serbian and Bosnian government military forces separated and in compliance with the peace agreement for one year. This one year restriction simplifies the IFOR objective and is a hedge against any mandate expansion. Expansion of tasking would most likely require increased troop strength, possible re-deployment of forces, and an extension of the one year deadline--conditions that should be politically and militarily unacceptable to NATO.

Political leaders in the past have summarily changed the mission objectives, expanded military tasking, and extended original withdrawal dates. Each of these scenarios can spell disaster for the operational commander. UNOC in the Congo, the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon, UNOSOM II in Somalia, and UNPROFOR in Bosnia are cases in point. In 1963 Congo, UNOC was not prepared for the sudden shift from traditional peacekeeping to offensive combat operations. Only ineptitude by the opposing forces averted total disaster.<sup>17</sup> The MNF was re-inserted into Beirut following the successful completion of their original objective. The hasty return undoubtedly contributed to poor operational planning and preparedness.<sup>18</sup> UNOSOM II mission tasking was expanded numerous times. What started as strictly humanitarian relief operation ending as a peace enforcement mission with numerous combat casualties.<sup>19</sup> UNPROFOR was ill-equipped, both militarily and psychologically, to handle the greatly increased tasking from countless UNSC Resolutions.<sup>20</sup> The history of U.N.

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<sup>16</sup> William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, "Statement," U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, *Deployment of U.S. Troops with the Bosnia Peace Implementation Force*, Hearings (Washington: Federal Information Systems Corporation, 1995), 8.

<sup>17</sup> Higgins, 97-124, 314.

<sup>18</sup> Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993), 59-60; George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 109, 111.

<sup>19</sup> Allard, 30-32; Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press: 1995), 269-272.

<sup>20</sup> Daniel Warner, ed., *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus

peacekeeping operations is replete with changing mandates and altered objectives.

In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there will be many calls to expand into civil policing, finding and arresting war criminals, investigating war crimes, rebuilding social infrastructures, medical care, etc. The list of requirements is virtually endless. The social and economic problems are staggering. The operational commander should anticipate endless media coverage of war crimes, medical crises, and social-economic problems; all of which may solicit military intervention and assistance. These extra military tasks may degrade economy of force, jeopardize IFOR impartiality, and ultimately risk successful completion of the objective. NATO must resolutely conform with the original mandate and firmly reject any requests to change in UNSCR 1031.

IFOR's vulnerability in meeting the objective is primarily tied to Serbian and Bosnian willingness to follow the Dayton Peace Agreement. Secretary of Defense William Perry has stated that "The U.S. and NATO are not going into Bosnia to fight a war..."<sup>21</sup> What are acceptable conditions for remaining in Bosnia-Herzegovina? At what point will NATO forces withdraw if fighting renews? The operational commander must determine precisely what will constitute conditions for IFOR withdrawal prior to the end of the mandate. Dealing with the occasional sniper, intransigent unit, or gang of thugs is well within IFOR capabilities. Engaging large combat units or a guerrilla insurgency are not within IFOR's mandate or capability.

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Hijhoff Publishers, 1995), 18-20, 26-31. UNPROFOR's original mandate was UNSCR 743 which was establishing UN Protected Areas in Croatia. UNPROFOR's mandate was subsequently expanded numerous times to humanitarian assistance, no-fly zones and eventually included NATO air units.

<sup>21</sup> Remarks as prepared for delivery by William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Chicago, 11 December 1995.

Six major factions with a total of nearly 500,000 combat troops are active in the theater of operations.<sup>22</sup> IFOR, with only 60,000 troops dispersed along the entirety of the cease-fire line, is not prepared for large-scale combat operations. If hostilities escalate, intelligence support will be crucial in determining the extent of fighting, which forces are involved and the probable objectives. If COMIFOR determines that large scale offensive operations are underway, he should withdraw IFOR from the the theater of operations. IFOR is in Bosnia-Herzegovina to enforce the peace, not to fight a war.

The renewal of large-scale offensive combat operation would effectively annul the Dayton Peace Agreement. In this event, the parties to the agreement have thus withdrawn their consent and the peace enforcement objective is irrelevant.

## Unity of Effort

*Seek unity of effort in every operation  
Joint Pub 3-07*

Operation Joint Endeavor has a unified command structure (figure 1) led by NATO under military authority of General George Joulwan (USA) NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and under political control of NAC. The U.N. is not in the chain-of-command and has no authority over IFOR. Admiral Leighton Smith (USN) is Commander, IFOR (COMIFOR) and has overall command of all NATO forces in the Bosnia-Herzegovina theater of operations.<sup>23</sup> *Admiral Smith is the operational commander.*

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<sup>22</sup> Theresa Hitchens and Robert Holzer, "Experts: NATO Must Reduce Weapons Now in Bosnia," *Defense News*, 4-10 December 1995, 22, 40.

<sup>23</sup> NATO, *Fact Sheet Background*, 1-2.

IFOR land forces are divided into three geographic regions each commanded by a divisional commander (U.S., U.K. and France) under overall command of Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Walker (U.K. Army) in Sarajevo. The IFOR Air Component Commander is Lieutenant-General Michael Ryan (USAF) in Vicenza, Italy. IFOR maritime components are divided between Admiral Mario Angeli (Italian Navy) as Commander, Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH) and Vice-Admiral Donald Pilling (USN) as Commander, Allied Striking Forces Southern Europe (COMSTRIKFORSOUTH).<sup>24</sup>




Figure 1. IFOR Command Structure.<sup>25</sup>

Fortunately, the IFOR command structure was not created ad hoc like all previous peace operations. It is a NATO command and control structure which has been repeatedly exercised and proven effective; however, the inclusion of the non-NATO nations poses serious challenges for command and control: language, doctrine, equipment compatibility, level of experience and training, etc.

The geographic division of Bosnia-Herzegovina under three division commanders simplifies the command structure. Non-NATO national contingents

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> NATO, Fact Sheet Background, 1-2.

should be placed under direct operational control of the division commanders vice the IFOR ground force commander. Dividing the fourteen non-NATO nations amongst the three division level commanders will simplify and streamline the chain-of-command. This will also 'marry-up' forces at the lowest possible level where division commanders can more effectively maximize their unique and varied capabilities. With this structure three divisional commanders will report to Lieutenant-General Walker vice some 30 separate national contingents of varied sizes and abilities.

The non-NATO nations create the most difficult C2 challenges in that they have not been incorporated into NATO doctrine. They have incompatible equipment, different tactical procedures, and for the most part vastly inferior training. Non-NATO nations bring modest capabilities to the operational theater at great expense to command and control (C2) effectiveness. The chain-of-command in place is very simple and direct. Each commander has but one superior to report to for direction (the Russian contingent is the sole exception). Any additional units deployed in theater should be operationally subordinate to COMIFOR. This clear, concise NATO command structure is in stark contrast to the command structure of UNOSOM II. In UNOSOM II, Major-General Montgomery was dual-hatted as USFORCOM under CENTCOM and as Deputy Commander to Lieutenant-General Bir under U.N. operational control. To further complicate matters some forces were OPCON to the U.N. and some OPCON to CENTCOM. This convoluted chain of operational command (along with several other reasons) contributed to the disastrous Army Ranger raid of 3 October 1993.<sup>26</sup> A clear chain-of-command through a single operational commander is even more imperative in Bosnia-Herzegovina where over thirty countries have air, ground and naval forces. In his book on Somalia lessons learned , Colonel Allard described the

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<sup>26</sup> Allard, 24-25, 56-58.

chain-of-command requirements in succinct terms: "If it takes more than 10 seconds to explain the command arrangements, they probably won't work."<sup>27</sup>

The parallel lines of national authority to field commands are minimized given that NATO countries have political representation in NAC. Non-NATO contingents will undoubtedly continue to receive some direction from their national leadership. This was the case in Somalia, where the Italian contingent opened direct negotiations with General Aideed in a flagrant violation of the UNOSOM II chain-of-command. This was apparently done with the blessings and encouragement of their national government.<sup>28</sup> Realistically, the operational commander has very little influence on this problem; however, he can alleviate the consequences by assigning these units to less crucial and controversial missions. He can also geographically relocate them or, as a last resort, send them home.

Non-NATO contingents may be less willing to go beyond the self-defense measures of the ROE without expressed approval from their national authorities. This undermines operational command authority and could prove disastrous in combat. Proper assignments for these units are crucial. The operational commander must maintain flexibility and assign them either geographically or by specific mission. For example: placing a Moslem contingent (such as Turkey or Egypt) in a predominately Serbian region would most likely invite problems; whereas, the Russians who have traditionally supported Serbia would be more welcome in Serbian sectors. Restricting these units to concise geographical areas will likely yield the best results. Assignment by mission area is also possible; troops can be quickly trained for some crucial (and less demanding) duties such as mine clearance or checkpoint duties. Placing a poorly trained and undisciplined non-NATO unit on a combat reconnaissance patrol invites disaster.

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<sup>27</sup> Allard, 92.

<sup>28</sup> Allard, 56-57.

In contrast to the effective NATO unified command structure, coordination with non-governmental organizations (NGO) and private voluntary organizations (PVO) presents a stark contrast. As their name infers, these organizations are not linked to governmental authority and in most cases are unwilling to coordinate with, respond to, or even associate with military authorities. COMIFOR must ensure a unity of effort with these organizations, yet he has absolutely no authority over their operations. During the operation, IFOR may be required to assist NGOs and PVOs. This may come in the form of medical assistance, evacuation, logistics support, or rescue. Ensuring these organizations are safe, effective and operating well (although not in his mission or authority) are in the best interests of IFOR objectives. The humanitarian relief, medical care, and civil government assistance these organizations provide will help maintain peace. COMIFOR should establish liaison through these organizations' parent headquarters or, if possible and appropriate, directly with local NGO and PVO personnel. COMIFOR will need patience, persistence, and respect for their independence to establish a 'unity of effort' in Bosnia. Effective working relations with these organizations will only enhance IFOR effectiveness.<sup>29</sup>

## **Legitimacy & Restraint**

*Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable & Apply appropriate military capability prudently*

Joint Pub 3-07

At the strategic level, legitimacy comes from UNSCR 1031 and the Dayton Peace Agreement. These documents accord legal status and authority

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<sup>29</sup> Concerns and lessons learned concerning civilian-military cooperation can be found in article by Theresa Hitchens and Brooks Tigner, "Bosnian Peace Hinges on Rebuilding Society," Defense News, 4-10 December 1995 and the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Report of the Seminar on Lessons Learned from the United Nations Operations in Somalia, 19-20 June 1995, 6-8.

to IFOR and their mission. Practically, the legal status accorded by these documents means little to the Serbian or Bosnian in the field. Operationally, COMIFOR must convince a multitude of local, heavily armed factions that IFOR has the legitimate right to enforce the Peace Agreement. At the operational level, legitimacy comes from fair and impartial treatment to all factions. Prudence in the use of force (restraint) is crucial to maintain the respect and cooperation of the Serbians, Bosnians, and Croats.

Excessively aggressive use of military power will undermine the legitimacy of IFOR. Conversely, timid use of military power will invite aggression and disregard for the U.N. mandates. The taking of hostages, continuous sniper fire, roadblocks and mortar attacks were the result of UNPROFOR failure to use appropriate force in response to aggression. Only after a series of NATO airstrikes and retaliation did the aggression against UNPROFOR wane.<sup>30</sup> Belligerents must understand that there will be a price to pay for aggression against NATO forces and failure to carry out the requirements of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

COMIFOR must carry out the Peace Agreement to the letter. He must not modify (neither increase nor decrease) the mandated requirements in any way. He does not have the legal authority to modify the agreement and even the slightest alteration to the agreement could lead to a flood of requests for changes and exemptions. Chaos and breakdown of the entire agreement could result. Any alteration for any one faction could also jeopardize IFOR impartiality.

ROE must be simple and straight-forward. The specific requirements should be reduced to plain language for every IFOR contingent and at a level of understanding that even the newest, most inexperienced soldier can understand and apply.

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<sup>30</sup> Fetherston, 85-86; Warner, 30-31.

## **Perseverance**

*Prepare for the measured, protracted application  
of military capability in support of strategic aims*  
Joint Pub 3-07

Currently the NATO commitment has been publicly stipulated at approximately one year. With this succinctly stated exit strategy, planning a long-term occupation is not required. However, twelve months in theater places a considerable strain on personnel and equipment. In the coming months, as routine sets in, fatigue and complacency will be the greatest enemy. COMIFOR should establish a schedule to rotate personnel or units to different assignments and provide rest and relaxation out of theater. The issue of combat readiness for units conducting peace operations must also be considered. What will be the combat readiness of the NATO units at the end of 1996? He must establish criteria for the minimum acceptable combat readiness for all IFOR units. He must provide for training in the theater of operations or unit rotation to meet these criteria. COMIFOR should strive to have the same level of readiness and effectiveness in the last month of the operation as he did in the first month.

## **Security**

*Never permit hostile factions to acquire a  
military, political, or informational advantage*  
Joint Pub 3-07

Most important to this concept is the inherent right of self-defense. The IFOR ROE provides for self-defense and permits IFOR to take preemptive action if necessary. This is a crucial distinction in this ROE from many previous peace operations. Excessively aggressive or unjustified use of

this preemptive capability will degrade the force legitimacy and could result in renewed fighting. Conversely, as stated earlier, timorous military responses to threats to IFOR will only threaten security. One of the keys to effective security is a robust intelligence capability. COMIFOR should prioritize the intelligence information flow to the tactical unit level--the division level headquarters in Tuzla, Gornji Vakuf, and Sarajevo. Timely intelligence on troop mobilization, weapons movements, and intentions are the key to security. Signal intelligence, imagery, and photography are important; however, IFOR intelligence should aggressively develop human intelligence sources throughout the theater. Unlike a U.N. peacekeeping force, NATO is not constrained in intelligence gathering and should aggressively pursue all tracks of intelligence sources.

COMIFOR should encourage professional contact between IFOR forces and all factions at the operational and tactical level to foster trust and understanding. IFOR should guard against a 'garrison' mentality and actively patrol and interact with the local populace. Mistrust and hostility from the local military forces and population must be overcome. The MNF in Lebanon demonstrated the inherent weakness of defensive type garrison amongst hostile forces.<sup>31</sup> A strong, active, visible IFOR presence is the best security against attack. A constant, visible air and maritime presence also sends a message of deterrence by demonstrating IFOR determination and capability.

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<sup>31</sup> John MacKinlay, *The Peacekeepers* (London:: Unwin Hyman: 1989), 84-86, 87-88, 106. The MNF did not have the consent to act as peacekeepers from all of the major forces in and around Beirut. The U.S. and French contingents assisted the Lebanese government forces and eventually lost credibility as a impartial force. The atmosphere in Beirut subsequently deteriorated. The U.S. and French forces eventually assumed a more defensive role in Beirut and lost their effectiveness as a peacekeeping force.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

COMIFOR is tasked with an extraordinarily complex mission. His operational planning should be guided by the six principles of OOTW. In addition, he should also consider the principles of war not recurrent in the OOTW principles: Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Simplicity, and Surprise.<sup>32</sup> These will provide useful guidance for peace enforcement operational planning.

COMIFOR has a clear, concise objective but must jealously guard against any 'mission creep' from public and political pressure. The command and control is well established and must be continually re-enforced especially for the non-NATO participants. COMIFOR should remain flexible and prepare to adjust missions or change geographic assignments as necessary. IFOR should maintain a strong and visible presence while actively seeking professional contact with all factions in theater. Active, visible, and offensively oriented air, ground, and maritime forces are the best security measure for continued Serbian and Bosnian cooperation.

Economic and social conditions are deplorable and six well-armed factions remain in the field, many of which are not in full agreement with the Peace Agreement. Although all major parties were signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement, not all factions are under tight control of the signatories. COMIFOR should always expect the worse and always prepare IFOR for Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian capabilities vice intent. Complacency and fatigue will soon become the biggest enemy. Until all factions

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<sup>32</sup> CJCS, Joint Pub 3-0, A-1, A-2.

are disarmed and demobilized, Bosnia-Herzegovina will remain a dangerous and volatile theater of operations.

This writer has discussed the guidance the operational commander could derive from the principles of operations other than war. These recommendations merely touch upon the guidance the operational commander can receive from these principles. He should continually re-evaluate Operation Joint Endeavor with respect to these principles to keep IFOR focused on the objective.

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